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Comments on Minghui Xiong and Wenjing Du’s “Between Evidence 
and Facts: An Argumentative Perspective of Legal Evidence” 
 
MARKO NOVAK 
European Faculty of Law 
New University 








The authors of this philosophically inspiring, succinct, and relatively wide-ranging paper 
discuss the problem of legal evidence in the framework of legal argumentation. By presenting 
legal evidence as the “objective basis for case-ruling,” they begin their paper with an analytical 
introduction of certain key theories and concepts that are relevant for their work, such as the 
difference between the theory of evidence-qua-material and the theory of evidence-qua-fact, 
highlighting certain shortcomings in the Chinese theory of legal evidence. They continue by 
discussing the “subtle” difference between the legal and philosophical sense of evidence, 
concluding the first part by referring to Walton’s theory of evidential reasoning and stressing 
the inferential relationship between evidence and facts (2002). 
The main body of the paper addresses the topics of evidential reasoning and fact 
argumentation, which they base on an informal-logic perspective. With respect to evidential 
reasoning, they assert a logical/inferential relation between evidence and facts, where induction 
is no longer satisfactory given that certain informal logicians (Blair & Johnson, 2011) have 
already devised conduction to better deal with defeasible reasoning. With respect to conflicts 
of evidence, they are cognizant of the multiple strategies for pursuing evidential reasoning, and 
are keenly aware of the potential of strategic maneuvering, but they also try to find certain 
objective frameworks to resolve such problems. They believe that these may be found in Di 
Bello and Verheij’s criteria of argumentation, probability, and scenario (2018) as methods 
utilized in both AI and law. 
Their fact argumentation is dedicated to the justification of a legal fact-qua-claim, and 
they end the paper with a section on strategic maneuvering to wrap up their dialectial-rhetorical 
approach built upon their previously developed theory of Argumentation-Based Litigation 
Game [ALG] (Xiong, 2010).  
The ALG appears to be an already established and coherent theory of legal 
argumentation based on a legal game interplayed by the suitor (S), the respondent (R), and the 
trier (T), which has now been extended to evidence reasoning and fact argumentation. In that, 
inspired by the Pragma-Dialectician van Eemeren (2018), they try to balance dialectic 
reasonableness with rhetorical effectiveness, since for the outcome of a legal controversy, of 
which evidential reasoning and fact argumentation is an inseparable part, it is not only important 




While the paper is both concise and well written, I have several suggestions as to how it may 
be improved upon in order to make it even more convincing. First, when dealing with evidential 
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reasoning in the legal/judicial domain, it seems that one cannot avoid a discussion of the 
degrees/standards of proof (such as, beyond reasonable doubt [in criminal procedures], the 
preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing evidence [in civil procedures], and 
mere probability [for temporary injunctions]). They are measures which are necessary in order 
for a fact-finder to render a decision with regard to the evidence presented. Apart from the 
necessity of a logical connection between evidence and fact, they are the necessary epistemic 
value for an inferential connection which is required for a particular legal field in which the 
evidence is used.  
The introduction of standards of proof to the discussion would be useful at several points 
in the paper, e.g., when the strength of evidence and the degree to which a set of evidence 
supports the facts are discussed (p. 5), and when referring Di Bello and Verheij’s (2019) 
normative frameworks to deal with conflicts of evidence (especially as regards probability). I 
am confident this would add another dimension to the ALG when dealing with evidential 
reasoning and fact argumentation, securing a better analysis of both the dialectical and 
rhetorical dimensions of the three crucial players in the legal game.  
Second, in terms of the rhetorical dimension of the ALG added at the end of the paper, 
the authors rely on van Eemeren’s concept of strategic maneuvering. I believe this reductionist 
concept of rhetoric, embracing merely rhetorical logos and effectiveness as its goal,1 could still 
work when the arguers S and R with their goal to “maximize their legal rights” are concerned. 
However, when T is discussed, the judge who is to “maintain judicial credibility through 
fairness and justice,” the concept of strategic maneuvering falls short of properly explaining 
judges’ normative concerns in moral situations. In unclear cases, especially novel ones, where 
the premises are enthymematic and thus the logic of the case runs out, or remains a formal shell 
to be filled with matters of more substance, judges most often rely on their personal values. 
Unless the ALG already has some firm reply to the abovementioned problem, I believe it would 
profit from including at least some kind of ethotic arguments and their heuristic potential when 
judges try to persuade their audience with some value-based aspects of the case, along with the 
dialectical reasonableness of their decisions.         
Thirdly, Floris Bex’s hybrid theory of stories and arguments (2010) does not seem to 
support the authors’ attempt to strike a balance between dialectical reasonableness and 
rhetorical effectiveness in their ALG. Despite being an excellent AI scientist, Bex tries to 
balance two dialectical approaches when developing his hybrid theory, one argument-based and 
another grounded in story-telling. Whilst it might be possible for the second approach to 
introduce rhetoric, and I would like to think that the authors intend to, unfortunately Bex deals 
more with abductive reasoning in the case of stories. In conclusion, I see his interesting attempt 
as one which tries to balance a more formal and less formal logical (dialectical) approach. 
However, there is no mention of some kind of effectiveness, strategic maneuvering, and the 
like, which one can find in van Eemeren’s concept of strategic maneuvering. This is therefore 
problematic since it is questionable whether one can use someone else’s theory for a purpose 
other than the one for which it was originally designed. Rather than relying on Bex to strike a 
“subtle balance” between dialectical reasonableness and rhetorical effectiveness, I suggest the 
authors should stick with van Eemeren’s strategic maneuvering, as long as they choose to accept 
his view of rhetoric, and perhaps supported their view by analyzing a specific case to illustrate 
the arguers following their rhetorical goals in a certain case. This was done to good effect in 
the utilization of the Shell case by van Eemeren (2010), and the legal cases used by Feteris 
(2012) and Plug (2019). 
 
1 Unlike some other approaches to rhetoric that include normative (heuristic) elements. If one wishes, these could 




Last, but not least, it seems that this conceptually quite clear and well written paper 
would benefit if the authors included some cases or material facts (and certainly evidence) in 
order to illustrate how their theoretical positions might work in practical situations. Whilst they 
do refer to some cases, merely mentioning them does not seem to suffice for those who are 
unfamiliar with them.  
To conclude, the authors provide an interesting account of how the dialectical and 
rhetorical goals of all the players in the legal game intersect in the framework of factual legal 
argumentation. As such, it contributes important insights to the overall scholarship in the field.     
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